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LIFE EXPECTANCY AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY
In an action by the injured person, loss of future earning capacity'
should not be computed on the life expectancy as affected by the injury,
but on the expectancy the person could have anticipated had he not been
injured.' In the bulk of cases, this point is academic. Many personal in-
juries, even though severe and permanent, do not appreciably affect life
expectancy. But where injury does decrease the person's expectancy, the
point can vitally affect damages.
To illustrate, suppose P suffers an injury to the kidney, heart or
other vital organ. Prior to injury, his earning life expectancy was 20
years.' As a resudt of the injury, his expectancy is decreased to 5 years.
Loss of earning capacity should be based upon the expectancy of 20 years
and not upon 5 years. Although -both principles of compensatory dam-
ages and case law firmly support this right, there is much authority-
almost exclusively dicta-which states or indicates that damages cannot
be given for loss of earning capacity beyond the date of probable actual
death.
THEORETICAL BASIS FOR RECOVERY
On tort damage principles, liability is basically imposed for all
damage directly resulting from a tort regardless of foreseeability.4 The
purpose of a damage award in a tort action for personal injury is to
compensate the person. The objective of compensation is stated by the
principle that the injured person should be given that amount which will
put him back in the same position he was in before injury. A person is
entitled to full compensation for any pecuniary loss occasioned by his
injury.5 Loss of earning capacity is the most obvious, and usually the
most substantial item of pecuniary damage-at least where there is per-
manent injury. This loss is determined by reference to the person's
earning capacity and the duration of the impairment.
If the injury is permanent, the duration is, of course, the injured
person's entire earning life expectancy. A permanent injury may result
in partial or total destruction of earning capacity. The impairment may
1 Past impairment or loss of time to trial is not considered in this article.
See 15 AM. JUR. DAMAGES, §81 et seq.
2 On mortality tables, see 50 A.L.R.2d 419 (1956).
3 Life expectancy and earning life expectancy may differ considerably. Since
this article is concerned with loss of earning capacity, it should be understood that
references to "life expectancy" means the period not just of life, but of ability to
earn income.
4Liability is assumed and only the measure of damages is involved. What
is "direct" and what is "remote," foreseeability as applied to causation, and
avoidability of consequences are thus not material to this article. See generally,
MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES (1935).
5 With respect to non-pecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering, the ob-
jective is probably better described as giving reasonable compensation. See
McCORMICK ON DAMAGES, §88, p. 315-319 (1935).
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progress from partial to total. The clearest, and most certain case of
total impairment is an injury which decreases or shortens life expectancy.
That decreasing life is an injury to the person would seem obvious.
Prior to injury, the plaintiff had a certain earning capacity and as a re-
sult of his injury, it has been impaired. Had he not been injured, he
could reasonably expect to earn money for the rest of his working life
and his loss is a sum which will restore that pecuniary loss to him.
Whether a person's earning life is sliced horizontally -by a crippling in-
jury or vertically by decreasing life itself, the effect on his economic
expectation is the same. Either way the cheese is sliced,' the plaintiff
loses a portion of his pre-existing power to earn income. Having a right
to life and a right to earn money, the fact that both of those rights suffer
the severest injury possible does not distinguish the situation from one in
which there is a total incapacitating without interference with life ex-
pectancy. 6
There does not seem to be any substantial basis for deducting living
expenses for the period 'between date of probable actual death and the
date of expectancy before injury. Ordinarily a court does not inquire
into the purpose to which the plaintiff would have put the money had he
earned it, nor the purpose to which he will put the money received in.
compensation for his loss. It is "none of the defendant's business." 7 If
he would have earned it, -he is entitled to recover its loss.' A different
situation is presented in determining damages to a decedent's beneficiaries
under a death act. If recovery is based upon loss to the beneficiaries,
obviously they would not have received, and consequently suffer no loss
of, the amount the decedent would spend on himself.9
6 The right of a living plaintiff to recover his full loss of earning capacity
should not be confused with the statutory rights arising after death under survival
and wrongful death acts. The survival action is a derivative of the injured per-
son's cause of action. A recovery by a living plaintiff therefore bars the survival
action. Under wrongful death statutes, the cause of action is generally considered
as a new one created in the designated beneficiaries. It is apparent that if an
injured person recovers, while alive, his full loss of earning capacity, a sub-
sequent recovery of a portion of the same loss in a wrongful death action would
result in double recovery on that item. The problem presented is one of the
proper allocation of damages. The great majority of courts, recognizing the over-
lap of damages, hold that a recovery during life bars the wrongful death action.
A minority, apparently overlooking the duplication that results, hold there is no
bar. For a discussion of this and related problems, see Duffey, The Maldistribu-
tion of Damages in Wrongful Death, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 264 (1958).
7 Olivier v. Houghton County St. Ry. Co., 138 Mich. 242, 101 N.W. 530 (1904).
8 See McCoR.MICK ON DAMAGES, §86, p. 303-304 (1935).
9 Cases holding that under a survival statute the measure is the decedent's
gross earnings are also authority for the non-deductibility of living expenses in an
action by a living plaintiff. While subject to criticism on the adoption of such a
measure in a survival case, the basis of such holdings is that the recovery is
exactly the same as the recovery the decedent could have had if alive. See Olivier
v. Houghton County St. Ry. Co. supra note 7; Mickel v. New England Coal & Coke
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AUTHORITY SUPPORTING RECOVERY
Authority for recovery of loss of earning capacity based on life
expectancy as it existed prior to injury 0 is substantial. 1
In Hallada v. Great Northern Railway, 2 plaintiff sued under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Federal Safety Appliance
Act."3 In affirming a judgment on condition of remittitur, the Minnesota
Court stated:
In personal injury actions it is elementary that the injured
party should be made financially whole by receiving the mone-
tary equivalent of the harm sustained by .him, inclusive of his
medical expenses, pain and suffering, past loss of earnings,
and, where a permanent injury is inflicted, his future losses
due to impaired earning capacity. In arriving at plaintiff's
damages for impaired earning capacity, the jury must first
determine from the evidence what the plaintiff normally
would have earned during the rest of his life had he not been
injured, deduct therefrom that sum which he may' reasonably
be expected to earn despite his injuries, and then reduce the re-
mainder to its present worth.
In the case of permanent injuries, it is necessary, in order
to ascertain the damages for impaired earning capacity, to
determine the life expectancy of the individual at the time of
the tort.1 4
In Prairie Creek Coal Min. Co. v. Kittrell,5 the lower court's in-
struction specifically charged the jury to determine loss of earning ca-
pacity "according to what you find his probable expectancy if he had not
received the injury complained of, if any ... "" In affirming, the
Supreme Court held:
The appellant contends that appellee should not recover
for the full expectancy of his life before the injury occurred,
Co., 132 Conn. 671, 47 A.2d 187 (1946); Pezulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26
A.2d 659 (1942).
10 More accurately, life expectancy unaffected by the injuries suffered. Con-
ceivably the plaintiff could suffer a later injury for which the defendant is not
liable. However, "prior to injury" is the expression most used by the courts.
11 The quantity of direct holdings is, relatively speaking, not too great. As a
practical matter, most permanent injuries do not affect life expectancy substantially,
if at all. If there is substantial impairment, death will frequently occur during
the normal time lapse before judgment. Revived actions and survival actions
cannot, in most states, be considered as authority on the rights of a living plaintiff
to recover loss of earning capacity. The relationship between such actions and
wrongful death actions presents peculiar problems in the allocation of damages
which materially affect the damages recoverable. See supra note 6 and infra
note 43.
12 244 Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673 (1953).
13 45 U.S.C.A. §51; 45 U.S.C.A. §1. The distinctions between the two causes
of action go to liability and not to damage principles.
14 69 N.W.2d at 685. Emphasis added.
15 106 Ark. 237, 153 S.W. 89 (1912).
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when the evidence shows that, by reason of the injury, he will
not live more than six months. The appellee had a right of
action against appellant, as soon as the injury occurred, for all
damages he had sustained, caused by the negligence of ap-
pellant. The true measure for loss of earning power is the
present value of these damages during the expectancy of
appellee's life, had the injury not occurred. By reason of the
injury, appellee was rendered a helpless and hopeless paralytic,
with a total loss of earning power for the full period of his
expectancy. Certainly this is one element of his damages.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky stated the matter clearly in
considering an instruction and the use of mortality tables. The appellant
contended that as a result of appellee's injuries he was at time of trial a
badly crippled, maimed man and therefore that mortality tables based on
a normal, healthy person were prejudicially misleading. In answer, the
Court held:
The question of damages was not alone what plaintiff
would in future be deprived of by reason of the injury, dating
it from the time of the trial, but to what extent his money-
earning capacity had been lessened or impaired (in addition to
suffering), and the value thereof, dating the inquiry from the
moment before the injury. Appellee's age and state of health
then were the facts upon which his expectancy of duration of
life was to be based. He was then in normal health and
condition. 16
In addition to the Arkansas, Kentucky and Minnesota cases, the
rule has been upheld by Massachusetts, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Texas
and Washington. 17
In actions under survival statutes, a number of courts have held
the recovery to be exactly the same as the decedent could have received
if alive. Many of these cases expressly state that the decedent, if alive,
could recover for loss of earning capacity during his life expectancy as
it existed prior to injury. Representative of this type of authority is the
Connecticut case of Chase v. Fitzgerald,'" the Michigan case of Olivier
v. Houghton County St. Ry. Co.,19 and the Pennsylvania case of
Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosa.2 6
1 6 Louisville Belt & Iron Co. v. Hart, 122 Ky. 731, 92 S.W. 951, 954 (1905).
17 Fournier v. Zinn, 275 Mass. 575, 159 N.E. 268 (1926) ; Webb v. Omaha &
S.L. Ry. Co., 101 Neb. 596, 164 N.W. 564 (1917); Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogma,
144 Neb. 394, 13 N.W.2d 627 (1941) ; Borcherding v. Ekland, 156 Neb. 196, 55
N.V.2d 643 (1952) ; Littman v. Bell Telephone Co., 315 Pa. 370, 172 Atl. 687
(1934); Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. McGlamory, 34 S.W. 359 (Tex. Civ. App.
1896), overruled on other grounds, 89 Texas 635, 35 S.W. 1058; Galveston,
H. & S. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 191 S.W. 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Richardson v.
City of Spokane, 67 Wash. 630, 122 Pac. 330 (1912). See also, Nelson v. Wiepen,
154 Neb. 458, 48 N.V.2d 387 (1951).
18 132 Conn. 461, 45 A.2d 789 (1946).
19 Supra note 7.
20 Supra note 9. See also, Kriesak v. Crowe, 36 F. Supp. 127 (D.C. Pa. 1941),
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CONTRA AUTHORITY DISTINGUISHED
Ordinary Personal Injury Cases
There are literally hundreds of cases involving permanent personal
injury in which the statement is made that life expectancy should be
taken as of time of injury. There being no claim of decreased or
shortened life span, this statement is accurate enough. In fact, such a
statement is a convenient means of separating consideration of past losses
from future losses. Taken literally, and out of context, it is inaccurate.
McCormick in his book states:
Should the life expectancy of plaintiff as of the date of
the injury, or as of the date of trial, be taken as the basis for
assessing future damage? Since the past effects of the injury,
such as expenses, loss of wages, and suffering, up to the date
of trial, can best be considered separately, it would seem that
the life expectancy of the plaintiff as of the time of the trial
should -be taken as the [basis for assessing future loss and in-
jury. If no claim is made that the injury will shorten plain-
tiff's life, no difficulty arises in applying this standard. If,
however, the plaintiff can show a probable shortening of the
life span, it seems that he should be entitled to compensation
for the loss of earning power in the years which will be cut
off. If so, then, in the light of such evidence as the proof by
the life tables of the normal life expectancy of a man of the
age of the plaintiff at the time of trial and evidence of the
health, habits, etc., of the plaintiff, before the injury and of
his present condition at the trial, the jury should be directed to
find, first, the number of years of life which the plaintiff could
normally have expected to have before him at the present time
if he had not been injured, and, second, his actual probability
of life at the present time, in his injured condition. They
should then be directed to fix the plaintiff's deprivation of
future earning power on the former basis of normal expect-
ancy and to estimate the anticipated expenses and the compen-
sation for future pain and suffering on the latter basis of
actual probable length of life.2 1
Cases Involving Future Pain and Suffering
A second source of confusion arises from cases in which loss of
earning capacity has been lumped in with recovery for future pain and
suffering. Pain, suffering and expenses should, as McCormick states
followed in Kriesak v. Crowe, 44 F. Supp. 636 (D.C. Pa. 1942), aff'd 131 F.2d
1023 (C.C.A. 3d 1942).
21MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, §86, p. 303-304 (1935). To illustrate his
point the author assumes a 20 year expectancy cut to 10 years by the injury. Loss
of future earning power should be computed on 20 years; pain and suffering on
10 years. See also 25 C.J.S., §81, p. 303; OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSON AND
PROPERTY, §184, p. 294 (1957); 4 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES, §1246, p. 4704 (4th Ed.
1916) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§912(e), 924(d), (e), (f) (1939).
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above, be determined by reference to the person's probable actual life.22
The duration of pain and suffering is necessarily only during actual life.
Where life expectancy is involved, an instruction which fails to distin-
guish future pain and suffering from loss of earning capacity is patently
prejudicial error. Unfortunately quite a number of cases involving such
an instruction simply state that all "prospective" or "future" damages
are to be computed on the expectancy after injury. The statements are
clearly dictum. In all of the cases examined, there was no consideration
of the time period for determining loss of earning capacity. Frequently,
neither decreased life expectancy nor loss of earning capacity was even
involved.
Illustrative of this type of authority are a number of Iowa cases.
23
In none of the cases does it appear that any claim was made for loss of
earning capacity for a period of decreased life expectancy. In several,
it is difficult to ascertain if the plaintiff even claimed his life was
shortened. In each case, the court was clearly concerned with the
propriety of an instruction as applied to damages for pain and suffering,
and the statements made are extremely general. Yet various authorities,
including Dean McCormick, have cited these cases as authority that
loss of earning capacity is based on physical condition at time of trial.24
Cases on Decreased Life Expectancy Zs a
Distinct Item of Non-pecuniary Damage
A third source of confusion arises from a failure to distinguish be-
tween a claim for pecuniary damage based on loss of earning capacity
and a claim for non-pecuniary damage based on shortened life itself,
separate and distinct from pecuniary injury.
There may be considerable virtue in the position that the right to
life as such deserves protection from an invasion which destroys totally
a portion of life-at least in an action by a living plaintiff. The English
courts recognize such an item of non-pecuniary damage.2  A number of
persuasive articles support such a view.26 But regardless of the merit of
such a view, it clearly has nothing to do with the right to recover full
22 Scott v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 160 Iowa 306, 141 N.W. 1065 (1913) ;
Webb v. Omaha & S.L. Ry. Co., 101 Neb. 596, 164 N.W. 564 (1917).
23 Canfield v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 142 Iowa 658, 121 N.W. 186 (1906) ;
Hughs v. Chicago & R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 150 Iowa 232, 129 N.W. 956 (1911) ; Scott
v. Chicago & RI. & P. Ry. Co., 160 Iowa 306, 141 N.W. 1065 (1913); Borough v.
Minn. & St. L. Ry. Co., 181 Iowa 1216, 184 N'W. 320 (1921).
24 McCoRMICK ON DAMAGES, §86, note 19 (1935). AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
contains a misleading statement similar to that in McCORMICK. 15 AM. JuR.
Damages, §377, p. 817.
25 Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354 (C.A.) ; Rose v. Ford, 1937 A.C. 820,
826, 3 All E. R. 359.
26 Smith, Physic Interest in One's O'wn Life, 98 U. PA. L. Rv. 781 (1950);
Conway, Damages for Shortened Life, 10 FORD. L. REV. 219 (1941); Note, 12
N.Y.U.L.Q. 535 (1935); Note, 10 U. CIN. L. REV. 271 (1936).
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compensation for the pecuniary loss resulting from impaired earning
capacity.
While no American case has recognized shortened or decreased life
as a distinct item of damage,2 7 the cases denying such a recovery have
muddied the area of loss of earning capacity. The principle case is
Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker.2" Counsel in that case specifically directed
his argument to recovery for the taking of life itself. The Indiana court
found that the instruction given authorized shortening of life "as an
element which of itself, simply, might be taken into account" and held
that no damages could be awarded "for the loss or shortening of life
itself." But on the point of earning capacity, the court stated that
shortened life "may be considered, in determining the extent of the in-
jury, the consequent disability to make a living, and the bodily and mental
suffering which will result." 9 If this statement has any bearing on the
problem here, it would seem to support recovery.30 Cases of the
Richmond type therefore are not relevant to the right to recover for
impaired earning capacity. 3 '
MISAPPLICATION OF COMMON LAW DEATH DOCTRINES
The most prevalent misconception is the apparent belief that at
common law no recovery could be had beyond the date of probable actual
death. This belief is found explicitly or implicitly in many cases in-
volving actions under survival statutes. Thus in discussions of wrongful
death, it is common for writers to refer to states having "expanded" or
"enlarged" survival statutes as opposed to "new cause of action" or
"Lord Campbell type" statutes. If by "expanded" and "enlarged" the
writer meant recognition of a right to sue in cases of instantaneous death,
the description might be accurate. However the reference is often very
clearly to damages and specifically to recovery for loss of future earnings
or savings. 
2
Under most survival statutes, the action is conceived as that of the
decedent and the recovery as in whole or in part that recoverable by the
decedent if alive. Thus to call the statute "expanded" because recovery
27 See 97 A.L.R. 823. Cf. Murphy v. New York & New Haven R.R. Co.,
30 Conn. 184 (1867).
28 146 Ind. 600, 45 N.E. 1049 (1897).
2945 N.E. at 1052. Shortened life, or the fear of it, may be considered in
determining mental distress under the Richmond case. See also Choicener v.
Walters Amus. Ag., Inc., 269 Mass. 341, 168 N.E. 918 (1929).
30 Unfortunately, the headnote in the West report is far broader than the
Court's opinion. "In an action to recover for personal injuries, the fact that the
plaintiff's life has been shortened thereby cannot be considered in assessing
damages." 45 N.E. at 1049.
31 A recent case of this type is Ham v. Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Br.
Auth., 92 N.H. 268, 30 A.2d 1 (1943). There are a number of Indiana cases
which follow Richmond.
32 See for example PROSSER ON TORTS, §165 (2d Ed. 1955) and particularly at
p. 713.
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is permitted for loss of earning capacity implicitly assumes that a lisqng
plaintiff could not have such a recovery.
An excellent example of misconception and misapplication of the
common law death rules appears in Krakowski v. Aurora E. & C. Ry.
Co. 3 With only slight trepidation, it can be asserted that the Krakowski
case is the only American authority involving an action by a living plain-
tiff in which it has been directly held that there can be no recovery for
loss of earning capacity for the portion of life destroyed by the injuries
suffered. The court there stated:
, * , At common law, no action could be maintained against
any person for wrongfully causing the death of another per-
son. It is only 'by virtue of some statute that such an action can
be maintained anywhere in this country or in England; . . . It
has never been held in this country, in the absence of a statute,
so far as we know, that there can be a recovery for the death
of any individual, or for the loss of any portion of his life.
The injured party cannot do that in an action for a personal
injury to himself, because death by reason of the injuries com-
plained of, at once puts an end to his suit, and his legal repre-
sentatives cannot continue or maintain such suit after his death,
unless authorized to do so by a statute.
34
It is, of course, perfectly true that at common law no action could
be maintained for wrongfully causing death-in fact, the rule applied in
Tort even if death occurred from other causes. The rule that death of
either party terminated the cause of action goes back much further than
Lord Ellenborough's unsupported and unfortunate dictum in Baker v.
Bolton. 5 But research has never disclosed a common law case in which
a living plaintiff was denied recovery for loss of his own earning capacity
over his expectancy before injury. Equally erroneous is reliance upon the
other common law rule which denied an action to the survivors for the
injury to them resulting from the death of another.
Neither of the common law doctrines rested on any principle of
damage law. Both dealt with actions brought, or sought to be continued
after death. The reasons, if any, upon which they were based are un-
known, or at least highly obscure, today.36
33 167 Ill. App. 469 (1912).
34 167 Ill. App. at 471-472 (1912).
35 1 Camp. 493 (1808), 170 Eng. Rep. 1033. "In a civil court the death of a
human being could not be complained of as an injury." The case did not deal
with an action by a living plaintiff for injuries to himself. For a discussion of
common law origins of the doctrine, see 25 U. DET. L.J. 72; Smith, Physic Interest
in One's Own Life, 98 U. PA. L. REv. at 785, 786.
36 It has been pointed out that the doctrines were not based on any concept
that the value of life could not be measured in money or that the damages would
be too speculative. This "reason" apparently originated with Hyatt v. Adams,
16 Mich. 179 (1867). See Smith, Physic Interest in One's Own Life, 98 U. PA. L.
REv. at 782-784. So far as measuring the pecuniary loss from decreased life ex-
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Probably the most curious authority lbearing on the question is the
recent English case of Harris v. Bright's Asphalt Contractor's Ltd.
The right of recovery in a living plaintiff appeared to have been recog-
nized in England at least as early as 1879.8 In fact, the English courts
allow recovery for shortened life as a distinct item of non-pecuniary
damage." In Roach v. Yates,4" the English Court of Appeal specifically
dealt with the question and appeared to hold that loss of earning ca-
pacity was recoverable over life expectancy unaffected by the injuries.
Yet in Harris, a trial court decision, Slade J. did an astonishing job of
distinguishing the earlier cases and held that a living plaintiff could not
recover. The case was apparently not appealed. It has been severely
criticised by English writers.4
DEATH FROM OTHER CAUSES
It is, or should be, apparent that in an action under a survival
statute, death from other causes establishes as fact the injured person's
actual life span. In such a case, it is patently absurd to even refer to
"prospective" damages. But just as patently, death caused by the injuries
suffered cannot possibly establish what life span the person could have
anticipated had he not been injured. Yet in some survival cases, courts
have held that recovery for loss of earnings was restricted to date of
death because death established the life span.4" Depending on the type of
death statute in the jurisdiction, the result of such cases may be entirely
correct,43 but certainly the reason is absurd.
pectancy, the measure and mode of proof is exactly the same as that used in any
permanent injury case.
37 [1953], 1 Q.B.D. 617, 1 All E.R. 395.
3 8 Phillips v. London & S.W. Ry. Co. (1879), 5 Q.B.D. 78. See also Fair v.
London & N.W. Ry. Co. (1869), 21 L.T. 326.
39 See authorities cited in note 25 stipra.
40 [1938], 1 K.B. 256 (C.A.), 3 All E.R. 442.
41 For a thorough analysis of English authority, and a critique of Harris,
see KEMP & KEMP, THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES, 1954 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.,
London).
42 Allen v. Burdette, 139 Ohio St. 208, 39 N.E.2d 148 (1942). See also the
lower court's opinion, 66 Ohio App. 236, 32 N.E.2d 852 (1940).
43 In a state, such as Ohio, where both a survival and a wrongful death
action may be brought, it is apparent that a problem of double recovery arises.
Duplication is avoided if the survival action is limited to date of death. In the
wrongful death action, recovery can be given for the period from death to ex-
pected life before injury. For an analysis and criticism of this result, see Duffey,
The Maldistrbutlion of Damages in Wrongful Death, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 264 (1958).
[Vol. 19
1958] COMMENTS
CONCLUSION
The constant advance of medical knowledge has and will make
proof of decreased life expectancy both more possible and more common.
Despite the mass of apparent authority to the contrary, the principle is
clear that recovery for impaired earning capacity should be allowed on
the plaintiff's life expectancy as it would have been without the injuries
suffered. To measure the loss on the person's life expectancy in his in-
jured condition would deny him full compensation for his own pecuniary
loss, and be inconsistent with the fundamental objective of a damage
action-placing the plaintiff back in the position he was in before injury.44
John I. Duffey*
44 In Rose v. Ford, infra note 25, Lord Roche pinpoints the fallacy that
permeates many discussions of this problem: ". . . it is theoretically wrong, in
such a case, to start from death as shortening life, but right to start with the
initial bodily injuries carrying with them from the outset a diminished expecta-
tion of life, which sooner or later will end with death."
*Assistant Professor, Ohio State University College of Law.
